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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FRANK E. MOXLEY, 
P e t i t i o n e r - A p p e l l a n t , 
v s . 
KEN SHULSEN, 
Responden t • 
Cas^ No* 870289-CA 
p r i o r i t y 3 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
P u r s u a n t t o S e c t i o n 7 8 - 2 a - 3 ( f ) , U . C . A . ( 1 9 5 3 , a s 
a m e n d e d ) , t h i s C o u r t h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n t o c o n s i d e r t h i s a p p e a l 
from an e x t r a o r d i n a r y w r i t of a c r i m i n a l c b n v i c t i o n of a second 
d e g r e e f e l o n y . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l a r e a s f o l l o w s : 
1 . Has t h e p e t i t i o n e r - r e s p o n d e n t b e e n d e n i e d h i s 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t he was d e n i e d e f f e c t i v e 
a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l i n t h e p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n a c t i o n p r e s e n t e d 
t o J u d g e j a y B a n k s . The a p p e l l a n t c l a i m s t h a t p r i o r c o u n s e l 
d i d n o t p r e s e n t a l l a v a i l a b l e e v i d e n c e c o n c e r n i n g p l a i n t i f f ' s 
m e n t a l s t a t e when t h e p l e a was c h a n g e d , d i d n o t a d e q u a t e l y 
c r o s s - e x a m i n e t h e e x p e r t w i t n e s s a s t o t h e p r i o r h i s t o r y of 
m e n t a l i l l n e s s , d i d n o t a d e q u a t e l y i n v e s t i g a t e t h e f a c t s in t h e 
p r i o r h e a r i n g and d i d n o t a d e q u a t e l y b r i e f t h i s m a t t e r on p r i o r 
a p p e a l . 
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2 . Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r i s n o t r e - o p e n i n g t h e 
i n q u i r y i n t o t h e p l a i n t i f f - p e t i t i o n e r ' s m e n t a l s t a t u s a t t h e 
t i m e he e n t e r e d a p l e a i n l i g h t of n e w l y d i s c o v e r e d m a t e r i a l 
c o n c e r n i n g p l a i n t i f f ' s m e n t a l s t a t u s a t t h e t i m e of t h e e n t r y 
o f t h e p l e a ; i n c l u d i n g , b u t n o t l i m i t e d t o , p r i o r r e p o r t s 
c o n c e r n i n g t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s h i s t o r y of m e n t a l p r o b l e m s and t h e 
t e s t i m o n y of an e x p e r t d o c t o r , P e t e r H e i n b e c k e r , P h . D . 
3 . D id t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r i n f i n d i n g t h a t t h e 
p e t i t i o n e r , a t t h e t i m e of h i s g u i l t y p l e a t o t h e o f f e n s e of 
m a n s l a u g h t e r , was n o t a c t i n g under m e n t a l i l l n e s s and had e n t e r e d 
an i n t e l l i g e n t p l e a , 
4 . . D i d t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r i n a c c e p t i n g t h e 
c o n c l u s i o n s o f D r . L e B e q u e ' s c o n c e r n i n g t h e p e t i t i o n e r -
a p p e l l a n t ' s m e n t a l s t a t u s a t t h e t i m e t h e p l e a was e n t e r e d . 
5 . Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r i n f i n d i n g t h a t t h e 
p e t i t i o n e r had f u l l y r e c o v e r e d from h i s m e n t a l i l l n e s s a t t h e 
t i m e t h a t he p l e d g u i l t y due t o m e d i c a t i o n he r e c e i v e d in l i g h t 
of t h e t e s t i m o n y by t h e p e t i t i o n e r Frank Moxley t h a t he d i d n o t 
t a k e t h e m e d i c a t i o n . 
6 . D i d t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r i n r u l i n g t h a t t h e 
p e t i t i o n e r ' s a p p e a l s h o u l d be d e n i e d b e c a u s e of t h e p r i o r a p p e a l 
t o t h e Utah Supreme C o u r t . 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1 . A r t i c l e I , S e c t i o n 5 , of t h e U t a h C o n s t i t u t i o n 
which p r o v i d e s : 
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The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
shall not be suspended unless, in cases of 
rebellion or invasion, the public safety 
requires it. 
2. Article I, Section 12, of the Utah Constitution, 
concerning the right to appear by counsel. 
3. Rule 65B(i), Sections (1) through (10), of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, concerning post-conviction 
remedies. 
4. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a writ of habeas corpus action filed by Mr. 
Frank Moxley, pro se, on July 13, 1984. This action is related 
to Mr. Moxley1 s confinement in the Utah State Prison as a result 
of a conviction entered in the criminal cpase of State of Utah 
v. Frank Moxley, case number CR79-6 5, for manslaughter, a second 
degree felony, after a plea of guilty wa^ entered on January 
29, 1980 in the Third Judicial District Cou|rt, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
Prior to this habeas corpus action, Mr. Moxley filed 
a prior habeas corpus action in the casd of F£anJc_Mo2c^ €^ _v_. 
£i!^£ence_Mo££2j! ' c a s e number C80-5023. In that prior and 
related case Mr. Moxley claimed that his plea of guilty should 
be set aside because the plea was not voluntarily entered. After 
a hearing on January 8, 1981, at 10:00 a.ta., Judge Jay Banks 
denied the relief sought in that habeas corpus action. 
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An appeal was taken in that matter to the Utah Supreme 
Court (EL^Ilh^jL^2^1^1^1j.^L^L^Il£^^2LLl^' 6 5 5 p«2d 640, Utah 
1982). The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the petition. (A 
copy of the petition is attached as Exhibit A in the Appendix.) 
After that denial, Mr. Moxley filed the present 
petition alleging that in the prior application (hereafter 
referred to '1980 Petition') his plea of guilty to the charges 
of manslaughter on January 29, 1980, was voluntarily and 
intelligently entered in light of his diagnosed mental illness. 
The petitioner contended that his mental illness prevented him 
from entering a legally sufficient plea of guilty. Mr. Moxley 
also claimed that his attorney in the 1980 petition had not 
effectively developed his history of mental illness as determined 
by experts since 1973 in the State of California and the State 
of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the second petition Judge Rigtrup ordered a hearing 
on the issues raised in the petition. In the hearing on the 
1984 Petition the petitioner submitted as exhibits documents 
submitted by the following experts each of whom diagnosed the 
plaintiff as having a mental illness: 
a. Thomas J. Meyers, M.D., South Pasadena, 
California (April 27, 1973) 
b. Charles E. Starr, M.D., Patton State Hospital, 
California (July 17, 1978) 
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c . R o n a l d A . M a r k m a n , M . D . , L o s A n g e l e s , 
C a l i f o r n i a ( A p r i l 2 7 , 1973) 
d . M i c h a e l D. N e s b i t t , | > h . D . , P a t t o n S t a t e 
H o s p i t a l , C a l i f o r n i a (September 1 1 , 1 9 7 8 ) . 
e . G e o r g e Y. A b e , N o r w a l k , C a l i f o r n i a ( A p r i l 
2 8 , 1978) 
f. D o r o t h y C o l o d n y , M . D . , U t a h S t a t e H o s p i t a l , 
P r o v o , Utah (December 2 6 , 1978) 
g . D e n n i s A. H a n s e n , B . S . , Utah S t a t e H o s p i t a l , 
P r o v o , Utah ( J a n u a r y 1 5 , 1979) 
h . J o h n P a u l W a l t e r s , M.D. (, T a r z a n a , C a l i f o r n i a 
( A p r i l 2 4 , 1978) 
i . H a r l d C . D e e r i n g , M • D . , L o s A n g e l e s , 
C a l i f o r n i a ( June 3 , 1973) 
j . C. C r a i g N e l s o n , M . D . , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 
(Oc tobe r 9 , 1979) 
k . R o b e r t J . H o w e l l , P h . D . , Utah S t a t e H o s p i t a l , 
P r o v o , Utah (December 2 7 , 1978) 
1 . Von 0 . A u s t i n , M . D . , U t a h S t a t e H o s p i t a l , 
P r o v o , Utah (August 7 , 1979) 
m. Manya A t i y a , M.D. (December 1 , 1978) 
n . B r e c k L e b e q u e , M.D. , U n i v e r s i t y of U t a h , S a l t 
Lake C i t y , Utah (October 2 3 , 1979) 
I n t h e 1 9 8 4 p e t i t i o n , a s a m e n d e d , t h e p e t i t i o n e r 
c o n t e n d e d t h a t t h e p r i o r r u l i n g d e n y i n g t h e r e l i e f shou ld n o t 
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be applied to the most recent action on any of the following 
grounds: 
a. The petitioner was denied effective assistance 
of counsel in the prior post conviction action on any of the 
following grounds: 
i. Prior counsel did not present all of 
the available evidence concerning the plaintiff's mental status 
when the plea was entered. 
ii. Counsel failed to adequately cross 
examine the expert witness as to the prior history of mental 
illness. 
iii. Counsel failed to adequately investigate 
the facts at the prior hearing. 
iv. Counsel did not present an adequate brief 
to the Supreme Court or present to the Supreme Court sufficient 
information to evaluate the appeal. 
b. The plaintiff discovered new material evidence 
concerning the plaintiff's mental status at the time of the entry 
of the plea, including the prior reports concerning the 
plaintiff's history of mental problems. 
In the present action, the hearing was set on two 
separate days, September 29, 1986, and March 13, 1987. On both 
occasions the court heard evidence and received exhibits. 
(Transcripts have been submitted to this Court as to both 
petitions which are available for review.) 
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On S e p t e m b e r 2 8 , 1 9 8 6 , t h e d e f e n d a n t c a l l e d as a 
w i t n e s s Dr . P e t e r H e i n b r e c k e r , a p s y c h i a t r i s t w i th a m e d i c a l 
degree from S t . Louis U n i v e r s i t y and a law degree from Georgetown 
U n i v e r s i t y . ( T . 11) D r . H e i n b r e c k e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had 
s p e c i a l i z i e d in f o r e n s i c p s y c h i a t r y and had been the c l i n i c a l 
d i r e c t o r of f o r e n s i c p s y c h i a t r y a t the Utah S t a t e Hosp i ta l for 
two y e a r s p r i o r to h i s t e s t imony . He had a l s o been a p rosecu to r 
for t h r e e years in S t . Lou i s , Missouri from 1965 to 1968. (T. 13) 
P r i o r t o t h e h e a r i n g Dr. Heinbrecker reviewed e x h i b i t 
n u m b e r o n e w h i c h i s a s e r i e s of d o c u m e n t s from v a r i o u s 
p s y c h i a t r i c e x p e r t s conce rn ing Frank Moxlqy's h i s t o r y . He a l s o 
wro te a l e t t e r express ing h i s op in ion concerning the e x t e n s i v e l y 
documented h i s t o r y of Mr. Moxley. (T. 15) He t e s t i f i e d t h a t 
he found s i g n i f i c a n c e in t h e f o l l o w i n g quote from Dr. Markham. 
The e x p e r t w i t n e s s s t a t e d c o n c e r n i n g an A p r i l 2 7 , 1973 l e t t e r 
as fo l lows : 
. . . On page four of t h a t r e p o r t in the second 
p a r a g r a p h on page f o u r , about halfway down, 
D r . Markham s a y s : "Al though h e ' s a b l e t o 
c o n c r e t e l y r e spond t o q u e s t i o n s , t h e r e i s 
s i g n i f i c a n t t h o u g h t c o n t a m i n a t i o n , paranoid 
d e l u s i o n s , t h o u g h t b l o c k i n g and l o o s e n e d 
a s s o c i a t i o n s t o p r e c l u d e a r a t i o n a l 
coopera t ion with c o u n s e l . " 
I t h o u g h t t h a t was i m p o r t a n t b e c a u s e t h e 
c o u r t when tak ing h i s p lea a t t h a t p a r t i c u l a r 
t i m e i n d i c a t e d t h e f a c t t h a t he answered 
her q u e s t i o n s , she f e l t , i n d i c a t e d t h a t he 
was c o m p e t e n t t o p l e a d . And I f e l t t h a t 
had t h e c o u r t b e e n aware of t h i s comment 
by D r . Markham, s h e m i g h t h a v e had some 
q u e s t i o n s a b o u t w h e t h e r h i s a n s w e r i n g 
q u e s t i o n s was a d e q u a t e as to whether or not 
he was able to be cons idered competent . 
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He also testified that based on his experience at the 
Utah State Hospital, forensic criminal unit, that it normally 
is difficult to obtain an objective evaluation of a person that 
is in jail and interviewed as opposed to the clinical atmosphere 
of the State Hospital, (T. 17) This factor would bear on the 
weight to be given the evaluations made prior to the plea. 
The doctor found to be significant the testimony of 
one of Mr. Moxley1s appointed attorneys Bruce Lubeck. (T. 19) 
He quoted portions of the prior writ of habeas corpus hearing 
of January 8, 1981. Mr. Lubeck, who was not present at the 
change of plea hearing which was conducted by associate counsel 
Fred Metos, stated as follows: 
And then on the last line, line 25, Mr. 
Lubeck says, "Mr. Moxley made up his mind 
probably four or five different times that 
he would take each one of those..." 
Dr. Heinbrecker testified that another factor which 
was important was that, contrary to Dr. Lebeque, he believed 
that the medication was not a stabilizing factor. (T. 23) He 
said that Mr. Moxley would have decompensated while he was in 
the Salt Lake County Jail awaiting his plea (T. 24). In his 
opinion the defendant Frank Moxley should have been further 
evaluated in light of all of the factors existing at the time 
of the entry of the plea. 
After the hearing, Dr. Heinbrecker reviewed a 
transcript of the proceedings before in Court on October 31, 
1979 and November 1, 1979. Counsel introduced, without 
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o b j e c t i o n , t h a t l e t t e r d a t e d Oc tober 9, 1986, as Exh ib i t no, 2 
o f t h e M a r c h 2 0 , 1 9 8 7 . (Page 10 of t h e March 2 0 , 1987 
t r a n s c r i p t . ) In t h i s l e t t e r Dr. Heinbrecker concluded t h a t a l l 
of t h e e v i d e n c e he had rev iewed led him to conclude t h a t t he re 
was a s u b s t a n t i a l doub t abou t Mr. Moxley's competence to plead 
g u i l t y t o m a n s l a u g h t e r in 1 9 7 6 . (T. 11) In t h a t l e t t e r , Dr. 
Heinbrecker s t a t e d : 
A l t h o u g h a t t h e t ime of t r i a l , Mr. Moxley 
d e c l i n e d u s i n g i n s a n i t y d e f e n s e for which 
I b e l i v e he was q u a l i f i e d , my opin ion remains 
t h e same. The homicide was d i rec j t ly r e l a t e d 
t o h i s p a r a n o i d s c h i z o p h r e n i c i l l n e s s . 
F u r t h e r , I b e l i e v e t h a t o t h e r p r i m e s were 
r e l a t e d t o d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h i n k i n g and 
c h a o t i c b e h a v i o r t h a t r e s u l t s from h i s 
i l l n e s s . H o w e v e r , t h e r e ' i b e e n no 
o p p o r t u n i t y to determine if Mr. Moxley would 
con t inue to offend over a per iod dur ing which 
h i s symptoms of i l l n e s s were ir| r e m i s s i o n 
on m e d i c a t i o n . I t i s l i k e l y t h k t p r e s n t l y 
t h e r e i s a c o m b i n a t i o n of s ch i zophren ic and 
c r i m i n a l p e r s o n a l i t y s t y l e . 
Mr. Moxley, a f t e r making a b r i e f s t a t e m e n t not under 
o a t h , was c a l l e d a s a w i t n e s s . (Page 29 of March 20 , 1987 
t r a n s c r i p t ) He s t a t e d t h a t w h i l e in the (Salt Lake County J a i l 
he would no t t a k e h i s m e d i c a t i o n as c o n c l u d e d by Dr. Lebeque 
from a r e v i e w of t h e j a i l r e c o r d s . He S t a t e d t h a t when t h e 
j a i l e r s b rought him h i s medica t ion he would "tongue i t " . (T. 30) 
By t h i s he meant t h a t he would fake tak ing h i s medicine to s p i t 
i t out l a t e r . (T. 30) 
At t h i s same t i m e , he was a member of a l awsu i t t h a t 
opposed t h e r e q u i r i n g of inmates to take p s y c h i a t r i c med ica t ion . 
(T. 31) He a l s o i n d i c a t e d t h a t he had d i scussed with h i s p r i o r 
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a t t o r n e y s t h e i m p o r t a n c e of h i s p s y c h i a t r i c h i s t o r y which was 
n o t i n t r o d u c e d fo r Cour t r e v i e w u n t i l t h e 1986 h e a r i n g . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1 . Did t h e cou r t e r r in r u l i n g t h a t i s s u e s having 
been r a i s e d in a p rev ious p e t i t i o n c o n s t i t u t e d a s u c c e s s i v e 
p e t i t i o n which was precluded by Rule 6(B) (i) (2) and (4) of the 
Utah Rules of Civi l Procedure. 
2 . Did t h e cou r t e r r in not f inding t h a t in l i g h t 
of the s u b s t a n t i a l new evidence concerning Mr. Moxley's mental 
s t a t e f the underlying conviction should be reviewed because such 
evidence should have been admit ted a t a p r i o r hearing and the 
f ac t t h a t i t was not in t roduced was a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l denial of 
counsel . 
3 . D id t h e c o u r t e r r i n n o t f i n d i n g t h a t i n l i g h t 
o f t h e c o n c l u s i o n s o f t h e C o u r t a p p o i n t e d e x p e r t , P e t e r 
H e i n b r e c k e r , t h e b u r d e n s h o u l d h a v e b e e n s h i f t e d t o t h e 
r e s p o n d e n t t o p r o v e t h e p l e a was c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y e n t e r e d . 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ISSUES 
HAVING BEEN RAISED IN A PREVIOUS PETITION 
CONSTITUTED A SUCCESSIVE PETITION WHICH WAS 
PRECLUDED BY RULE 6(B)(i)(2) AND (4) OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Judge Rigtrup entered an order concluding as a matter 
of law, that the Court on this second petition was not in a 
position to overrule the previous District Court order and that 
11 
t h e p e t i t i o n e r was a s u c c e s s i v e p e t i t i o n p r e c l u d e d by Rule 
6 5 B ( i ) ( 4 ) , Utah Rules of C i v i l P rocedure , "fhat s e c t i o n s t a t e s : 
4 . A l l c l a i m s of t h e d e n i a l of a n y 
c o m p l a i n t a n t ' s r i g h t s s h a l l b^ r a i s e d in 
the pos t c o n v i c t i o n proceedings brought under 
t h i s Rule and may no t be r a i s e d in another 
s u b s e q u e n t p r o c e e d i n g except foi^ good cause 
shown. 
The r u l i n g of t h e Cour t in l i g h t of t h e s u b s t a n t i a l 
new evidence which r e q u i r e s reexaminat ion of} Mr. Moxley's o r g i n a l 
p l e a i s a t e c h n i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n of the Rules of C i v i l Procedure 
and has the same r e s u l t of applying the d o c t r i n e of r e s j u d i c a t a . 
The d o c t r i n e of r e s j u d i c a t a d o e s n o t a p p l y i n 
p e t i t i o n s for w r i t of h a b e a s c o r p u s . The c o u r t s have reasoned 
t h a t any s u c h t e c h n i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e Rules of C i v i l 
P r o c e d u r e would v i o l a t e t h e p r o v i s i o n s of the C o n s t i t u t i o n s of 
a l m o s t e v e r y s t a t e wh ich p r o h i b i t s t he | s u s p e n s i o n of t h e 
p r i v i l e g e of w r i t of habeas c o r p u s . See a l s o S t a t e v . D i s t r i c t 
^2J^£i_2^-.She£j .dan_CounJb^, 621 P.2d 223 (Wyoming, 1980) , and 
In r e ; Richard M., a minor, 537 P.2d 363 ( C a l i f o r n i a , 1975) . 
In t h e Wyoming d e c i s i o n the Courts held t h a t a person 
may p e t i t i o n for a w r i t of habeas corpus acjjain and again to the 
same or s i m i l a r c o u r t i r r e s p e c t i v e of whether appea l i s taken 
in t h o s e a c t i o n s . The Court f e l t t h a t t h i ^ r u l i n g was requ i red 
by t h e c o n s t i t i o n a l p r i v i l e g e which p r o h i b i t s t h e s u s p e n s i o n 
of w r i t s of habeas c o r p u s . Utah has t h e isame c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
p r i v i l e g e c o n t a i n e d in A r t i c l e I , S e c t i o n 5 of the Utah S t a t e 
C o n s t i t u t i o n . 
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In any event, the defendant is not filing an identical 
petition to the one that was previously on appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Court. In this petition he has raised separate 
constitutional grounds concerning the effectiveness of his 
representation by prior counsel in the prior appeal and important 
factual considerations. For the first time an expert appointed 
by the court had testified concerning the questionable mental 
state of Mr. Moxley. 
The petitioner admits that if this case were identical 
to the prior petition for writ of habeas corpus this Court, 
without applying the doctrine of res judicata, could have entered 
an order denying the petition based upon the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law entered in the prior action. However, 
the Court cannot find that the petitioner intentionally waived 
any of the relief requested in the petition because he is 
alleging that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel, 
who was advising Mr. Moxley as to the presentation of the prior 
habeas corpus action. 
The petitioner submits that the Court erred in not 
granting the relief requested by the petition and in ruling that 
the Court was not in a position to overrule the District Court 
or consider the petition because of the prior petition. 
II 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE FOUND THAT IN LIGHT 
OF THE SUBSTANTIAL NEW EVIDENCE OF MR. 
MOXLEYfS MENTAL STATE, THE UNDERLYING 
CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVIEWED BECAUSE SUCH 
13 
EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AT A PRIOR 
HEARING AND THE FACT THAT I T WAS NOT 
INTRODUCED WAS A CONSTITUTIONAL DENIAL OF 
COUNSEL* 
I n Cod J. a n na_ v^_Mo££ j . s , 660 P . 2 d 1 1 0 1 ( U t a h , 1983) , 
t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t r e c o g n i z e d t h a t i n c e r t a i n u n u s u a l 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , c o u n s e l s d e f i c i e n c i e s may be s u f f i c i e n t l y g r i e v o u s 
t o d e p r i v e a p e r s o n of e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l . In such 
s p e c i a l c a s e s t h e C o u r t i n d i c a t e d i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of 
c o u n s e l may r e q u i r e a c r i m i n a l c o n v i c t i o n t o be r e - e x a m i n e d . 
The p e t i t i o n e r s u b m i t s t h a t t h i s p r e s e n t s u n u s u a l 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s which shou ld c a u s e t h e c o n v i c t i o n t o be r e - e x a m i n e d 
and s e t a s i d e . As d e t a i l e d in t h e S t a t e m e n t of F a c t s , t h e Cour t 
a p p o i n t e d e x p e r t D r . P e t e r H e i n b r e c k e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t he d i d 
n o t b e l i e v e t h e p e t i t i o n e r was c o m p e t e n t t o e n t e r a p l e a . 
M o r e o v e r , f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , t h e Cour t h e a r d t h e t e s t i m o n y from 
Mr. Moxley and had a l e n g t h y and e x t e n s i v e m e d i c a l r e c o r d . The 
s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e r e c o r d s a n d t h e o p i n i o n of t h e h i g h l y 
q u a l i f i e d e x p e r t i s s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e of t h e i n e f f e c t i v e 
p r e s e n t a t i o n c l a i m e d by Mr. Moxley by h i ^ p r i o r c u n s e l a t t h e 
h a b e a s c o r p u s h e a r i n g . 
The s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e , i f p r e s e n t e d t o a Cour t t h a t 
d i d n o t a p p l y t h e t e c h n i c a l p r e c l u s i o n r u l e a p p l i e d by J u d g e 
R i g t r u p , s h o u l d h a v e r e s u l t e d i n a f i n d i n g t h a t Mr. M o x l e y ' s 
p l e a was n o t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y e n t e r e d . 
I n
 Moxlex^v^Mo^i^s, 655 P.2d 640 (Utah, 1982), the 
Court held t h a t the record did not support a con t en t i on t h a t 
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the p lea was i n v o l u n t a r i l y or u n i n t e l l i g e n t l y entered. In that 
c a s e , Mr. Moxley's h i s t o r y of mental i l l n e s s was not p a r t of 
t h a t r e c o r d . Now i t i s a v a i l a b l e and p a r t of the record and 
in l i g h t of t h a t h i s t o r y of mental i l l n e s s , the examination at 
t h e t r i a l c o u r t d o e s n o t c a r r y t h e we igh t g i v e n to t he 
examination in the pr ior appeal . 
At t h e p r i o r h e a r i n g b e f o r e J u d g e B a n k s , t h e 
p e t i t i o n e r 1 s c o u n s e l c a l l e d Dr. Breck Lebeque as a wi tness 
( T r a n s c r i p t of hear ing on 1-8-81 pg. 8 ) . At t h a t hearing Dr. 
Lebeque t e s t i f i e d s i m i l a r i l y to h i s testimony contained in the 
l e t t e r introduced by the State at the second hearing before Judge 
R i g t r u p . At the p r i o r h e a r i n g , no expe r t wi tness was c a l l e d 
such as Dr. Heinbrecker; in add i t ion , none of the medical repor ts 
c o n c e r n i n g Mr. M o x l e y ' s m e n t a l h i s t o r y c o n f l i c t s with Dr. 
Lebeque's testimony. 
The other two witnesses to t e s t i f y at the pr ior hearing 
were the two at torneys who as public defenders were representing 
Mr. Moxley a t the time of h i s change of p lea . As ref lec ted by 
Dr. He inbrecker , one of Mr. Moxley's a t torney Bruce Lubeck had 
subs t an t i a l questions concerning his competency. 
The c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h i s case p r e s e n t the type of 
c i r cums tances which r e q u i r e r e e v a l u a t i o n of the p r i o r d e n i a l 
and p r i o r a p p e a l . Dr. He inbrecker ' s testimony is new relevant 
evidence as to the p lea . 
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III 
IN LIGHT OF THE CONCLUSIONS OP THE COURT 
APPOINTED EXPERT PETER HEINBRECKER THE PLEA 
WAS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY ENTERED AND SHOULD 
BE SET ASIDE• 
In State_v^_B£ecj<en£idge , 688 P|.2d 440 (Utah, 1984), 
the Court stated that trial courts have in undoubted duty to 
guard against the possibility that an accused may be induced 
to plead guilty without a sufficient understanding of the volume 
of the charge or consequences of his plea. See also State v. 
Gj. bbon s
 r 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah, 1987). Hn Gj-bbons the Court 
held that the present Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure do not 
have any time limit on motions to set aside a plea of guilty 
in a criminal case. The same policy behind this ruling should 
also allow the appellant to review his concetn about the legality 
of his plea. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit One qf the Appendix is a 
transcript of the plea entered by Mr. Moxley on January 29, 
1980. The appellant submits that this Court, upon review of 
the attachments and in light of all of the new evidence from 
the experts will find that the plea should b^ set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
The e v i d e n c e now a v a i l a b l e , i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e 
e x a m i n a t i o n a t t h e t ime of the e n t r y of th^ p l e a , r e q u i r e s t h a t 
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the Court enter an order requiring the lower court to set aside 
the appellant's conviction and plea of guilty. 
Respectfully submitted this day of January, 
1988. 
RANDALL GAITHER 
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, 
to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114, on this day of January, 1988. 
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ADDENDUM 
A t t a c h e d h e r e t o i s a c o p y o f a T r a n s c r i p t of t h e 
p r o c e e d i n g s of J a n u a r y 2 9 , 1 9 8 0 / when t h e p e t i t i o n e r - a p p e l l a n t 
e n t e r e d h i s p l e a t o t h e c r i m i n a l i n f o r m a t i o n . 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; TUESDAY, JANUARY 29, 1980 
3:00 P.M. 
—ooOoo— 
THE COURT: Let the record show that we are 
assembled again on Fred Moxley Criminal No. CR 79-565. Counsel 
for the State is present, Mr. Charles Marsden. Also present 
is counsel for defendant, Fred Metos^ The defendant 
Frank Edward Moxley is also present is the courtroom. 
MR. MOXLEY: Yes, ma14m. 
THE COURT: As I understand it, Mr. Moxley, 
you expressed a desire to withdraw yc}ur plea to the earlier 
information filed in this matter; is that correct, Mr. Metos? 
MR. METOS: Yes. Mr. Moxley has agreed that 
upon the Statefs motion to amend the motion to manslaughter, 
Mr. Moxley will plead guilty to that offense. 
THE COURT: Let me makle sure that it is clear 
that the defendant is withdrawing his plea of not guilty 
in the original information, and as I understand the State 
desires to amend the information to atLlege the crime of 
manslaughter, a felony of the second degree and a violation 
of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 205C. Is that correct? 
MR. MARSDEN: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And is thai correct, Mr. Metos 
and Mr. Moxley? 
MR. MOXLEY: Yes, ma'arju 
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MR. METOS: Yes. 
THE COURT: The Court will grant the defendant 
Frank Edward Moxley permission to withdraw his plea to the 
original information. Court will likewise grant the Staters 
motion to modify and amend that information. I will make 
the necessary amendments on the original information contained 
in the file as indicated to me by counsel for the State. 
MR. METOS: We have no objection to that. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. Mr. Moxley, 
you have been charged at the present time pursuant to the 
amended information with manslaughter, a second degree felony 
in violation of of 76 Chapter 5 Section 205CR with the contents 
of that information and the counts charged. 
MR. MOXLEY: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: And how do you wish to plead 
in connection with that information? 
MR. MOXLEY: Guilty. 
MR. METOS: With respect to that plea, I 
have prepared an affidavit that Mr. Moxley has read and 
reviewed. He stated to me he has no questions. The record 
should reflect that he is ready to sign it now and is in 
fact signing it, is in fact signing that affidavit. 
THE COURT: All right, the record should 
reflect that the Court has witnessed Mr. Moxley placing 
his signature upon that document. That document has now 
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been executed by Mr. Metos on behalf of the defense and Mr. 
Marsden on behalf of the State. 
In connection with his signature on that 
document, Mr. Moxley, I would like to have your own counsel 
ask you a number of questions which you should answer 
completely and fully and honestly. And the Court may have 
some additional questions for you as well. I would like 
also to have you .sworn as a witness in connection with those 
questions too. Would you raise yotir right hand, please. 
FRANK EDWARD MOXLEY, 
was duly sworn and upon examination testified as 
follows: 
THE COURT: Are you comfortable standing 
there, Mr. Moxley? Would you prefer to sit or would you 
prefer to sit on the witness stand? Wherever you're most 
comfortable you may remain. 
THE WITNESS: I'd like to sit on the witness 
stand. 
THE COURT: All righ^. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. METOS: 
Q For the record, would you staie your name, please. 
i •' ' 
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been executed by Mr. Metos on behalf of the defense and Mr. 
Marsden on behalf of the State. 
In connection with his signature on that 
document, Mr. Moxley, I would like to have your own counsel 
ask you a number of questions which you should answer 
completely and fully and honestly. And the Court may have 
some additional questions for you as well. I would like 
also to have you .sworn as a witness in connection with those 
questions too. Would you raise your right hand, please. 
FRANK EDWARD MOXLEY, 
was duly sworn and upon examination testified as 
follows: 
THE COURT: Are you comfortable standing 
there, Mr. Moxley? Would you prefer to sit or would you 
prefer to sit on the witness stand? Wherever you're most 
comfortable you may remain. 
THE WITNESS: I'd like to sit on the witness 
stand. 
THE COURT: All right. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. METOS: 
Q For the record, would you state your name, please. 
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A Frank Edward Moxley. 
Q And Frank, you had just entered a plea of guilty to 
the offense of manslaughter. 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And do you understand that you have certain constitu-
tional rights that you're waiving by entering that plea? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And one of those is a right to a trial by jury. 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And these would be eight jurors who are picked from 
the Salt Lake County. 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And you1re waiving the right to have these eight people 
determine your innocence? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q You also realize that you hfeve a right against self-
incrimination. Do you understand what that means? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q That means that you have a tight not to give any evidence 
against yourself. 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And that means that the State must produce the evidence 
against you and prove your guilt. 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And you bear no burden in proving your innocence in 
1 
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this case. 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And you understand that means that you have no obligation 
to testify on your own behalf. 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And the jury would be instructed that they are to 
attach no weight to the fact that you did not take the witness 
stand and testify in your own behalf. 
A Yes, sir. 
Q You understand that you have the right to subpoena 
and call witnesses in your own behalf. 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And by pleading guilty you1re waiving that right. 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And you waived your right against self-incrimination? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And you realize that you have a right to an appeal? 
A Would you run that by me again? 
Q You do realize that you have a right to appeal under 
the laws of Utah. 
A Under this plea? 
0 No, generally you have a right to an appeal. You 
realize that? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And by pleading guilty to the offense of manslaughter 
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! you 
| of 
1
 A 
Q 
1
 re waiving that right as to ar^ y questions of the substance 
the charge. 
Yes, sir. 
Now, Frank, you realize that} this is a second degree 
felony. 
A 
Q 
ten 
A 
Q 
Yes, sir. 
And the maximum penalty for that offense is two to 
years in the state prison and a $10,000 fine. 
Yes, sir. 
And that it would be up to the judge to decide what 
| sentence to impose in this case. 
A 
1 Q 
you 
A 
: Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
in 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes, sir. 
And have any promises or threats been made against 
? 
No, sir. 
And you're pleading guilty on your own free will? 
Yes, sir. 
And upon my advice and Mr. Lubeck's advice; 
Yes, sir. 
Have any promises been made to you regarding the sentence 
this case? 
No, sir. 
Now, you understand all thos^ rights? 
Yes, sir. 
And you're doing this on youxj own free will? 
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A Yes, sir. 
Q So this is a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty 
to the lessor offense of manslaughter? 
A Yes, sir. 
MR. METOS: Does the Court have any further 
questions? 
THE COURT: I do-have several questions. 
Do you have any additional questions you'd like to ask, 
Mr. Marsden? 
MR. MARSDEN: Not at this time, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Moxley, I want 
you to clearly understand from responding to these questions 
that the plea of guilty which you have expressed a desire 
to enter in this case essentially admits the truth of the 
charge in this case. A plea of not guilty denies the 
charge. Do you understand that distinction? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: And do you understand that by 
entering a plea of guilty you admit to the charges that 
have been made against you in the information? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Do you further understand that 
you may have some defenses to the charge, and as a matter 
of fact, in this case some of those have been discussed 
at length in this courtroom, but if you plead guilty you 
DAVIS & SANCHE7 215 BOSTON BLDG . SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111, (801) 363-7939 
1 waive those de fenses . That i s , yoi|a give them up. 
2 THE WITNESS: Yes , ma'am. 
3 THE COURT: Do you further understand that 
4 you may, in fact, lose the right tcj> complain on appeal in 
5 connection with any of those defences and also in connection 
6 with any rulings that this Court may have made in the 
7 proceedings up unt.il now. 
8 THE WITNESS: Yes, ir^ a'am. 
9 THE COURT: All right, specifically, if you 
10 have any complaints about the fairmess of this Court's 
U treatment of you in any of these prpceedings or any question 
12 or complaint about any ruling I havfe made respecting 
13 continuances and so forth, by entering a plea of guilty 
14 at the present time you may waive ahy rights to ever complain 
15 or appeal about those rulings. 
16 THE WITNESS: Yes, mi1 am. 
1? THE COURT: All right, you have been charged 
18 in the amended information with causing the death of another 
19 person under circumstances where yoii. reasonably believed 
20 that you had some kind of a moral oaf legal justification 
2i or extenuation for your conduct, even though the conduct 
22 was not in fact legally justifiable or excusable under the 
23 existing circumstances. Do you understand that charge? 
04 THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am. 
2S I THE COURT: And do yolu wish to admit that 
— • J 
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in fact you did as you have been charged with doing? 
2 I THE WITNESS; Yes, ma1am. 
3 THE COURT: All right, it is my duty to advise 
4 j you that the sentence which could be imposed pursuant to 
your plea of guilty is a sentence of from 1 to 15 years 
incarceration. That is a minimum of one year and a maximum 
of 15 years and/or a fine of $10,000- Do you understand 
that that sentence may be imposed? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, ma1am. 
THE COURT: Do you further understand that 
the Court does not promise you anything with respect to 
that sentence? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Have any promises been made to 
you by either the prosecution or your defense counsel in 
connection with the sentence? 
THE WITNESS: No, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Are you of the opinion, 
Iir. Moxley, that any person has used any threats, pressure, 
or intimidation to cause you to plead guilty at this time? 
THE WITNESS: No one has intimidated me, 
threatened me, or made any promises. 
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Metos, for the 
record and as counsel for the defendant, can you assure 
the Court that as far as ycu know no assurances or 
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understanding other than what may ha\te been discussed here 
today, this afternoon, have been made to the defendant? 
MR. METOS: I will so ssure the Court. 
THE COURT: All right Do you have any further 
questions, Mr. Marsden? 
MR. MARSDEN: Yes. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MARSDEN: 
Q Mr. Moxley, would you indicate for the record that 
you have had an opportunity to talk tqo Barbara Kosh, your 
best friend; is that right? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And you're using her counsel and advice as well; is 
that right? 
A Yes, sir. 
MR. MARSDEN: Thatfs all I have, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Moxley, I have 
no more questions for you. If you'd like to step down and 
be seated at counsel table, you may. Before I make a finding 
with respect to the defendant's decision to plead guilty, 
I would like the record to reflect those facts which the 
prosecution would place into evidence at the time of trial 
with respect to the manslaughter charge. 
MR. MARSDEN: Would yo^ like me to recite 
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l J them? On about November 7, 1978, at 122 North Third West, 
defendant shot Richard Evans in the neck, and the evidence 
would indicate that he was no closer than ten feet away 
at that time. 
THE COURT: Do you have any exceptions or 
objections to those facts as recited, Mr. Metos, on behalf 
of the defendant? 
MR. METOS: I would like to add a few facts 
to further corroborate, that Mr. Marsden and I have discussed 
this at length, and in the last several days especially. 
And we have both reached an opinion that the charge as now 
filed against Mr'. Moxley and to which he has pleaded guilty 
is an appropriate charge. Mr. Moxley did believe that his 
life was in danger. Drs. Breck Lebegue and Craig Nelson 
would testify that it was, in fact, Mr. Moxley's belief 
that his life was threatened. 
However, as Mr. Marsden indicated, the 
circumstances surrounding the incident in all likelihood 
weren't a reasonable personfs act as Mr. Moxley acted. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. Mr. Moxley, 
do you have any facts or circumstances that you need to 
add, or do you have any exceptions to take to the facts 
rhat have been recited here? 
MR. MOXLEY: Yes, ma?am, as far as circumstances 
are concerned, it's my belief that although I have pled 
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guilty to manslaughter, I do admit that I do fall under 
that category, but for the record I would wish to say that 
I did act in self-defense. What I did I felt I was justified 
in doing. That's all I have to say. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. I need 
to discuss one additional question in connection with that 
statement, Mr. Moxley. As I understand it, you believe 
you were justified in doing what ydu did or at least you 
believed at the time you did it yoij were justified in doing 
what you did; is that correct? 
MR. MOXLEY: I not dnly believed then, but 
now, and I just would like to let that be known. 
THE COURT: Let me make clear to you, 
Mr. Moxley, that the charge of manslaughter involves the 
causing of a death of another under| circumstances where 
the person who causes the death as you did here reasonably 
believes that the circumstances provide a moral or legal 
justification. That apparently is the case, but the last 
part of thar statutory definition of manslaughter reads 
as follows: "Although the conduct i$ not legally justifiable 
or excusable under the then existing circumstances." 
And in order for me to be able to acicept your plea, you 
have to admit and the Court has to be satisfied that you 
admit that the circumstances surrounding your conduct were 
such that your conduct was not, in fact, legally or morally 
• 
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justifiable. 
MR. MOXLEY: I admit to that, ma'am. 
THE COURT: And you understand the distinction 
I!m making in point of time between now and then? 
MR.. MOXLEY: Oh, yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: I do have one additional question. 
There has been some guestion throughout these proceedings 
about your satisfaction with your counsel, and I pressed 
you rather hard this morning as I recall to indicate to 
me the source of the problems you felt you were having with 
counsel at that time. Are there any other facts having 
to do with your satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the 
counsel who has served you throughout the case to this point 
that you have not already told the Court about? 
MR. MOXLEY: Well, ma'am. I wish to clarify 
some things. This morning I was distorting the facts as 
a way of manipulation to receive a postponement when in 
fact Mr. Bruce Lubeck and Mr. Metos have been very good 
attorneys. And in no way have they done anything that would 
warrant a dismissal as far as defense is concerned, and 
I retract the words that I said this morning. 
THE COURT: At this time, at the time of 
entering this plea, are you satisfied with the services 
that they have rendered on your behalf and with the advice 
that they have given you? 
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MR. MOXLEY: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Thank yo\j, Mr. Moxley. You may 
be seated. Based upon your responses to the Court's questions 
and those of Mr. Metos, the Court finds that your decision 
to plead guilty to manslaughter, a felony in the second 
degree, is freely, voluntarily, and intelligently made. 
And that you've had the advice and counsel with competent 
lawyers with whom you say you were satisfied. Your plea 
will be accepted with the Court. Th^ Court having accepted 
that plea, the question of sentencing arises. 
MR. METOS: With respect to that, Your Honor, 
I've informed Mr. Moxley that he has the right to be sentenced 
in not less than two nor more than tetn days. Mr. Moxley 
has quite candidly admits and expects, based on his prior 
record, to be sentenced to prison. As the Court is aware, 
he has a prior manslaughter charge. |He has a prior assault 
with a deadly weapon charge. He has la not guilty with respect 
to insanity. His desire is to receive the credit for the 
time he has been serving while awaiting trial on this. I've 
explained to Mr. Moxley, and I believe Mr. Marsden has also 
explained that that sort of a thing ik not going to carry 
very much if any weight with the Board of Pardons. They're 
•che ones that decide parole dates. 
However, should Mr. Motley have to do the 
entire ten-year term at the Utah Statel Prison, at that point 
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it may make a difference, Mr. Moxley does desire that credit, 
By way of explanation, I believe most of 
the continuances in this case and the delays were as a result 
of Mr. Moxleyfs mental state. Quite often we get close 
to a preliminary hearing or a trial, and there would be 
a question of Mr. Moxley!s competence. He would be sentenced 
to the State Hospital for some 30 days for an evaluation, 
some of which he was found not competent to stand trial, 
some of which he was found competent. And I believe, and 
I think Mr. Marsden will corroborate this, that those were 
the major reasons for the delay in this. And if the Court 
wants further inve-stigation with respect to the time to 
sentence, we would be willing to put the sentencing date 
over into a ten-day period. If not, he's prepared to waive 
the minimum time sentencing. 
THE COURT: Do you have any witnesses you 
would care to adduce? Would the defendant have any evidence 
it would care to bring before the Court on that issue? And 
we1re only talking about a recommendation that I might or 
might not write to the Board of Pardons and Parole when 
Mr. Moxley is committed to the Utah State Prison. 
MR. MARSDEN: We*11 waive the necessity for 
bringing witnesses. What Mr. Metos says is basically correct. 
We'll agree with that. 
THE COURT: Would you have anything further 
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other than the statement you've already made? And Mr. Moxley, 
let me be sure you understand what is happening here. You 
have a statutory right to be sentenced, and it is my obligation 
to sentence you no less than two and no more than ten days 
from today's date, your plea of guilty having been accepted 
by the Court and entered. If you desire to waive that time, 
you may, and you may waive it either for purposes of being 
sentenced here today or you may waive it for purposes of 
setting a .hearing at which any evidence you desire might 
be presented to the Court in connection with sentencing. 
MR. MOXLEY: I would like to give the Court 
time to evaluate everything and would a probationary report 
be appropriate? 
MR* MARSDEN: Pre-sentence report. 
THE COURT: That is something that could 
be requested, and it would be at th$ discretion of the Court 
to order such a report prepared. Excuse me for interrupting, 
Mr. Metos, but I wonder since all the implications of 
sentencing have not been discussed with Mr. Moxley, would 
it make sense to schedule the sentencing for two days hence 
and permit you an opportunity to discuss that? 
MR. METOS: Mr. Moxley was wondering about 
the possibility of a pre-sentence report so this Court could 
°e apprised of some of the mental problems that Frank was 
ncvmg at the time of the incident. But I was indicating 
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to him that there are other ways we can do that. First 
of all, we have numerous doctors' reports we can provide 
you with. Secondly, the other option we could ask for is 
a 90-day evaluation at the State Hospital which would give 
you basically the same information. 
MR. MARSDEN: Your Honor, I've made a promise 
to the defendant. It's not, of course, binding. He has 
asked me that tie not go to the State Hospital. The State 
fully intends to request this Court that if it does want 
a 90-day evaluation or a pre-sentence report, if that's 
what Mr. Moxley wants, that it be done at the Utah State 
Prison. 
THE COURT: That would be my ruling m any 
case, so it boils down to Mr. Moxley1s desire to have such 
a report prepared, and what he needs to consider is that 
m the likelihood of such contents it might be that he wants 
to proceed on what is before me now than on a more complete 
record. 
MR. MOXLEY: I think it would be appropriate 
to just go ahead and let you sentence me now, because a 
pre-sentence report really is not going to change facts 
of the matter. I have a debt to owe to society, and I might 
as well get started. 
THE COURT: Is it your desire then to waive 
the two-day waiting period that you're entitled to by statute 
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before I sentence you? 
2 I MR- MOXLEY: I'd like to wait a couple days. 
3 THE COURT: You would like to wait a couple 
4 days? 
5 MR. METOS: You have the option of waiting 
6 two days or getting sentenced today, and it will all be 
over with if she sentences you today. If we wait two days, 
g I we can get the information from the doctors). 
9 MR- MOXLEY: Is there any possible consider-
ation? I guess probation will be out of th^ question; is 
n I that right? 
THE COURT: From what I have seen from the 
case and what I have seen of your record, I suspect that 
it would be a very long shot. I think you're talking in 
terms of likelihoods there. 
MR. MOXLEY: Well, the reason I fd like to 
wait a couple days perhaps would be that I know I may be 
thinking off the wall, but there are program^ I know that 
maybe I could — there is like a thing called — there is 
various programs throughout the State. 
THE COURT: The only thing Ifiti concerned 
about is I think you haven't considered with counsel and 
with the advice of counsel the sentencing optjions that are 
available to the Court. And counsel may have given some 
advice based on experience as to what the Coufrt is likely 
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do with those options. I think what I would like to 
is set sentencing for 9 a.m. this Friday morning to give 
a an opportunity to collect, and we can change that date 
it's inconvenient. 
MR. METOS: I believe both Mr. Lubeck and 
are due in the District Court, and thatfs the regular 
ntencing time for Judge Baldwin and Judge Sawaya. If 
could do it at 1:00. 
THE COURT: Let's do it at 1:30 on Friday, 
that's all right with you, Mr. Marsden. 
MR. MARSDEN: Yes, Your Honor. 
MR. METOS: Would the Court desire to have 
le doctors' reports that we have? 
THE COURT: I would read any material which 
)u submit to me which you feel is relevant to the question 
: sentencing this defendant. I'm unaware on the basis 
: what I've seen of the case thus far of anything that 
would specifically request, so I'll make the indication 
D you that I'll read anything you get to me by Friday morning 
t 9 a.m. and take it into consideration on Friday. Is there 
ny further business before the Court? 
MR. MARSDEN: Nothing. 
(Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m. the 
preceding in the above-entitled 
matter was concluded.) 
—ooOoo— 
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